EMPLOYMENT AT WILL IN THE UNITED STATES:

THE DIVINE RIGHT OF EMPLOYERS
Clyde W. Summerst
Men must be left without interference... to discharge or retain
employees at will for good cause or for no cause, or even for bad
cause without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se.1
The Tennessee Supreme Court articulated the employment at will
doctrine in 1884, thus endowing employers with divine rights over their
employees.
This doctrine has been, and still is, a basic premise
undergirding American labor law. The United States, unlike almost every
other industrialized country and many developing countries, has neither
adopted through the common law or by statute a general protection against
unfair dismissal or discharge without just cause, nor even any period of
notice.
This distinctive aspect of American labor law is more than a minor
oddity concerning protection from dismissal. Its tentacles reach into
seemingly remote areas of labor law, for at its roots is a fundamental legal
assumption regarding the relation between an employer and its employees.
The assumption is that the employee is only a supplier of labor who has no
legal interest or stake in the enterprise other than the right to be paid for
labor performed. The employer, as owner of the enterprise, is legally
endowed with the sole right to determine all matters concerning the
operation of the enterprise. This includes the work performed and the
continued employment of its employees. The law, by giving total
dominance to the employer, endows the employer with the divine right to
rule the working lives of its subject employees.
It is this assumption which gives American labor law much of its
distinctive character. In other countries, employees are viewed as members
of the business enterprise. In Germany, for example, the employee-elected
works council has, in addition to representation on the supervisory board,
codetermination rights over decisions such as work schedules, leaves,
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safety and health measures and guidelines for hiring, transfer and dismissal.
If the employer and the works council cannot agree on these matters, the
issues are submitted to binding arbitration. In Sweden, the union must be
consulted on "any matter relating to the relationship" between the employer
and the employees.3 This includes such matters as a decision to introduce
new machinery, sell the company or hire a new managing director. In
Japan, the union is consulted on nearly all matters of employee interest and
employees are commonly referred to as "members of the family., 4 The
general assumption underlying the employer-employee relationship in other
countries is that employees are more than mere suppliers of labor. Rather,
they are members or partners in the enterprise and are thereby entitled to a
voice in the decisions of the enterprise which affect them. This variance in
assumptions results in significantly different legal rules and labor relations
systems.
There is clearly an ambivalence toward this fundamental assumption
in the courts and legislatures of the United States; most labor legislation is
intended to protect employees from employer indifference or oppression
and the courts have developed some rules which limit employer absolutism.
This generates much of the tension and confusion in American labor law
and labor relations. To understand the American system, therefore, it is
necessary to understand the doctrine of employment at will, its fundamental
assumptions, and its ambivalence. More importantly, it is necessary to
recognize where that fundamental assumption has shaped our labor law.
I.

THE RoOTS OF EMPLOYMENT AT WILL

The English common law, as formulated by Blackstone, viewed the
employment relation as a contractual relationship that bound the parties to a
continuing relationship. The terms of the contract were those expressly or
implicitly agreed to by the parties. According to Blackstone, where the
parties did not specify the duration of employment, the law construed it to
be a hiring for one year.5 This presumption of yearly hiring could be
rebutted by facts showing a different intent of the parties; different intent
might be shown by customs of the industry or the length of pay periods.
The United States largely followed the English common law, but the
2. See Worker Constitution Act, 1972, Sections 87, et seq. See generally M.

WEISS,

(1987);
C. Summers, Worker Participationin the U.S. and West Germany: A Comparative Study
from an American Perspective,28 Am. J. Comp. L. 367 (1980).
3. See generally Clyde Summers, Worker Participationin Sweden and the United
States; Some Comparisonfrom an American Perspective, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 893 (1976).
4. Clyde Summers, Employee Voice and Employer Choice: A Structured Exception to
Section 8(a)(2), 69 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 129, 134 (1993).
5. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES 413.
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presumption of annual hiring was not generally adopted. Courts looked to
the facts and circumstances of each case to determine the parties' intent,
with the most critical fact being the period of payment. Some courts held
that where the pay was stated as so much a week, a month, or a year, there
was a presumption that the hiring was for the period named. 6 Other courts
rejected the use of any presumption and determined whether employment
was at will on the basis of facts surrounding the contract. By 1870, the law
in the United States was confused, with courts going in diverse directions.7
In 1877, a treatise writer, Horace Wood, sought to distinguish the English
decisions and resolve the contradictions in American law with a dogmatic
declaration which is considered to be the source of the American
employment at will rule:
With us, the rule is inflexible, that a general hiring or indefinite
hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to
make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is on him to establish it by
proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month or year; no time
being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption
attaches that it was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for
whatever time the party may serve."
Wood's Rule, by imposing a blanket presumption that all indefinite
hirings were at will, misstated existing law. It explicitly rejected those
decisions which held that there was a presumption that employment was for
the period of stated pay and imposed the opposite presumption that such
employment was at will. It also rejected those decisions where the court
determined the intent of the parties without the weight of any presumption;
instead, it imposed a blanket presumption of employment at will which no
court had imposed before.
Wood's Rule did not win immediate acceptance. For example, in
1891, the New York Court of Appeals applied the pay period presumption,
stating, "[i]n this country, at least, if a contract for hiring is at so much per
month, it will readily be presumed that the hiring was by the month, even if
nothing was said about the term of service." 9 However, four years later the
same court, quoting Wood's treatise, held that an employee hired for a
stated annual salary could be discharged in mid-year without cause.' °
Because of the prestige of the New York Court of Appeals, this decision

6. SeeJ. CHrIrY, LAW OF CONTRACTS 532-34 (10th ed. 1876).
7. For a detailed study of the development of early American employment law, see
Sanford M. Jacoby, The Durationof Indefinite Employment Contracts in the United States
and England:A HistoricalAnalysis, 5 COMP. LAB. L.J. 85 (1982).
8. HORACE G. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877).
9. Adams v. Fitzpatrick, 26 N.E. 143, 145 (N.Y. 1891) (quoting SCHOULER'S
DomESTic RELATIONS 698 (4th ed.)).
10. See Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 42 N.E. 416,417 (N.Y. 1895).
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gave credibility and dominant authority to the employment at will doctrine,
and by 1930, the doctrine had become embedded in American law. The
doctrine was accepted without question or discussion.
Why did American law take this turn? Various explanations have
been proposed, but none are fully persuasive. It is argued that the rule was
appropriate to laissez faire capitalism,11 but a principle of limited
government intervention can not explain why one presumption rather than
another is to be imposed; neutral interpretation of the parties' intent would
be more appropriate to laissezfaire. The Marxian explanation is that most
of the cases were brought by middle class managers and white collar
workers. The at will doctrine enabled the capitalist owners to deflect the
challenge of an emerging managerial professional class. 2 This scarcely
explains why the rule persisted when the managers, not the owners, did the
hiring and firing. It is suggested that the doctrine, when developed,
reflected the dominant pattern of employment which was characterized by
short-term employment, with workers constantly changing jobs. 13 But the
plaintiffs in the cases were not day laborers; they were predominantly white
collar workers who were commonly long-term employees. Nor does it
explain why the doctrine stubbornly survived when employment became
predominately long-term with
vested interests in seniority, pensions and
14
benefits.
accumulated
other
Apart from these explanations, the premises of the doctrine are quite
clear; the employer has sovereignty except to the extent it has expressly
granted its employees rights. The doctrine thus expresses and implements
the subordination of workers to those who control the enterprise. In the
absence of a protective provision in the contract of employment-and only
upper level managers have such contracts-workers are totally subordinate.
Their terms and conditions of employment can be changed in any way at
any time and they can be dismissed without reason and without notice.
11.

JUDICIAL ELABORATION OF EMPLOYMENT AT WILL

Wood's Rule, as stated, was only a rule of contract interpretation, a
presumption to be applied in interpreting the employment contract. It was
not to be applied if, "from the language of the contract itself it is evident
11. See Mary Ann Glendon & Edward R. Lev, Changes in the Bonding of the
Employment Relationship:An Essay on the New Property,20 B.C. L. REV. 457 (1979).
12. See Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976).
13. See Matthew Finkin, The Bureaucratization of Work: Employer Policies and
ContractLaw, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 733 (1986).
14. For a critique of the explanations offered to explain the development of the
employment at will doctrine, see Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and
Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 Mo. L. REv. 679 (1994).
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that the intent of the parties was that it should at all events continue for a
certain period or until the happening of a contingency."' 5 The courts,
however, have commonly ignored the presumption language and have
enlarged the rule of interpretation into a substantive rule which overrides
the parties' intent. Three sample cases are sufficient to illustrate this
enlargement.
In Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co.,16 the company sought to employ
an engineer who had been offered a university professorship. The
company promised that if he would reject the professorship, give up his
business as a consulting engineer, move to the employer's location, and buy
the retiring superintendent's house, he would be given "permanent
employment" at a stated salary. The engineer agreed, rejected the
professorship, gave up his business, relocated his family, and bought the
superintendent's house. Two years later he was discharged without
explanation. When he sued for breach of contract, the Minnesota court, in
a semantic somersault, held that his employment was at will. The court's
logic was simple:
the words 'permanent,' 'lasting,' 'constant,' or 'steady' applied to
the term of employment, do not constitute a contract of
employment for life, or for any definite period, and such
contracts fall under the rule 'that an indefinite hiring at so much
per day, or per month, or per year, is 1a7 hiring at will, and may be
terminated by either party at any time
The court asserted that the fact that Skagerberg had rejected the
professorship, given up his business, moved, and bought the
superintendent's house, all in reliance on the employer's promise, added
nothing because these actions in no way benefited the Company. The court
did not weigh the facts or circumstances to determine the intention of the
parties, nor did it apply a presumption. Rather, the court applied a rigid
rule that "permanent employment" was "indefinite" employment and
"indefinite" employment was, by definition, employment at will. The
alchemy of judicial reasoning transformed "permanent employment" to
employment at will for the employer and dissolved obligations of estoppel
to the employee.
In East Line & Red River RailroadCompany v. Scott,I" the employee
settled a personal injury claim against the railway in return for the railway's
promise that he would have a job "for whatever length of time [the
employee] might desire to retain such employment."' 9 The Texas court
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

WOOD, supra note 8.

266 N.W. 872 (Minn. 1936).
Id. at 877.
10 S.W. 99 (Tex. 1888).
Id. at 100.
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recognized that the contract gave the employee the right to fix any period,
but because he had failed to fix a period prior to being discharged, the
contract was indefinite and, therefore, at will. The choice of length of term
allotted by agreement of the parties to the employee was thus transferred by
the court to the employer.
In Main v. Skaggs Community Hospital,2° the written contract stated
that employment could be terminated for "just cause" by giving 60 day's
notice. The Missouri court held that since the contract had no specified
duration, it was at will and the employee could be discharged without just
cause and without notice. Otherwise, said the court, the contract would
create a prohibited "obligation in perpetuity." "Just cause" by judicial logic
became "no cause."
These cases make clear that in cases of employment by contracts the
courts do not apply the elementary principles of contract interpretation.
Regardless of what the employer promises or leads employees to
reasonably believe, unless the contract specifies a definite term, the
employee can be discharged at any time, without reason and without notice.
Because employment is rarely for a specified term, except for upper level
management and some professional employees, the resulting legal pattern
of employment in the United States is employment at will. Such a result
betrays the court's underlying assumption that the employer should have
absolute power over the employees' jobs; to reach that result, words will be
twisted and the parties' intent ignored.
III. JUDICIALLY CREATED EXCEPTIONS

In the 1970's, some courts which were ambivalent about the divine
right of employers began to devise various lines of reasoning to limit the
harshness of employment at will. These exceptions had the potential to
undermine the doctrine and its assumptions and to provide protection to
many employees unjustly discharged.
One device was to circumvent the doctrine entirely by allowing at will
employees who were discharged to sue in tort rather than in contract. In a
path-breaking case, the California court held that discharge of an at will
employee because he refused to commit perjury was contrary to public
policy, and the employee could sue in tort for loss of wages, emotional
distress, and punitive damages. 21 This public policy exception has been
widely recognized by other courts. It has been used to protect employees

20. 812 S.W.2d 185 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
21. See Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1959). See generally Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful
Discharge:The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983).
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who were discharged for serving on a jury,22 for filing claims for workplace
injuries,' 3 for refusing to join in the employer's illegal practices, 24 for
objecting to their superiors about legal violations,2 and for reporting such
violations to public authorities.26 The exception has also been used to
protect employees who have refused to lobby the legislature for legislation
sought by their employer, 27 women who have rejected sexual advances of
supervisors, 28 and employees29 who have refused to participate in games
involving indecent exposure.
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress has also been
used to award damages to discharged employees when the discharge was
made in an extreme and outrageous manner and caused severe emotional
distress. Thus a 60 year old vice-president who was demoted to working in
the warehouse to do menial work, such as sweeping and cleaning the
warehouse cafeteria, could recover for ensuing psychological problems. °
Another device for limiting employment at will was to marshal
ordinary contract principles in order to carve out exceptions to the rigid
rule that an employment for an indefinite time is a contract at will. The
first exception was the "handbook rule," which was articulated by the
Michigan Supreme Court in 19801 and is now accepted in most states.
When an employer distributes to its employees an employee handbook or
policy manual stating various rules of conduct, procedures, and benefits,
the handbook or manual becomes a part of the employment contract. If the
handbook states offenses for which an employee may be disciplined, gives
assurances that an employee will not be dismissed without cause, or
provides procedures for disciplining employees, then any discharge which
does not follow the handbook is a breach of contract. In the words of the
New Jersey Supreme Court:
A policy manual that provides for job security grants an
22. See Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975).
23. See Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
24. See Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992); Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v.
Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
25. See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980).
26. See Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Field v.
Phila. Elec. Co., 565 A.2d 1170 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
27. See Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d. 894 (3d Cir. 1983).
28. See Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984).
29. See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985).
30. See Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1991). See generally
Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of IntentionalInfliction of
EmotionalDistress,41 STAN. L. REv. 40 (1988).
31. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich.
1980). See generally Deborah A. Schmedemann & Judi McLean Parks, Contract
Formation and Employee Handbooks: Legal, Psychological,and Empirical Analyses, 29
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 647 (1994).
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important, fundamental protection for workers .... If such a
commitment is indeed made, obviously an employer should be
required to honor it .... [T]he judiciary, instead of "grudgingly"
conceding the enforceability of those provisions, should construe
them in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the
employees.32
The handbook rule does little more than apply the basic contract
principle that a person is bound by promises implicit in a course of conduct
which creates reasonable expectations in the other party.
Another contractually based exception invokes the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, which in American law is an implied
obligation in every contract. When a married woman who refused to date
her foreman was discharged, the New Hampshire Supreme Court declared
that "termination by an employer of a contract of employment at will which
is motivated by bad faith or malice.. .constitutes a breach of the
employment contract. 3 3 The California Court of Appeals, Second District4
went further to apply the implied covenant to all long service employees.?
When an employee with eighteen years of service was discharged without
cause, the court held that "termination of employment without legal cause
after such a period of time offends the implied-in-law covenant of good
faith and fair dealing contained in all contracts, including employment
contracts. 35 Later a California court applied the covenant to protect
employees with as little as seven years service. 6 A Montana court looked
to the employee handbook, positive job evaluations, promotions, and oral
assurances and found that the employee had an "objectively reasonable
belief that he would be fired only for good cause. 3 7 His discharge without
just cause violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing which was
"designed to prevent the abuses of unfettered
discretion inherent in a
38
power.
bargaining
unequal
situation of
In these cases, the courts held that a violation of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing was a tort with potentially large damages for awards
for emotional distress, pain and suffering, and punitive damages.39
32. Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1264 (N.J. 1985) (citations
omitted), modified, 499 A.2d 515.
33. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
34. See Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1980).
35. Id. at 729.
36. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
37. Stark v. Circle K. Corp., 751 P.2d 162, 166 (Mont. 1988) (citation omitted).
38. Id. at 167 (citation omitted). See generally Monique C. Lillard, Fifty Jurisdictions
in Search of a Standard: The Covenant of Good Faithand FairDealingin the Employment
Context, 57 Mo. L. REv. 1233 (1992).
39. But see Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (overruling
Cleary, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, on damages).
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IV. THE EXCEPTIONS CIRCUMSCRIBED

The development of these exceptions to the employment at will
doctrine presented the prospect that the doctrine would became an
anachronistic shell, and proposed statutes prohibiting dismissal except for
just cause promised to sweep the doctrine totally away.40 However, this did
not happen. The exceptions were narrowly restricted and statutory
proposals died aborning. The employer's divine right to dismiss at any
time, for any reason, and without notice has survived with vigor.
A public policy exception has been grudgingly applied. In most
courts, it is not utilized unless the public policy is clearly expressed in
some statutory or constitutional provisions. When a salesman reported to
company officials that a product he was selling created serious safety risks
41
to purchasers and their employees, he was discharged as a troublemaker.
The court held that because there was no statute clearly mandating that the
product be safe, the public policy exception did not apply. 42 Other courts
have held that employees could be discharged for dating or marrying a
fellow employee because no constitutional or statutory provision was
implicated.43 When an employer demanded, with the threat of discharge,
that an employee divorce his wife because she was Catholic, the court
'strikes at the
could find no "clearly defined mandate of public policy that
4"
responsibilities."'
and
duties,
right,
social
citizen's
a
of
heart
Even the presence of a statute or constitutional provision may not be
enough. The discharge of a lobbyist for a defense contractor for publicly
criticizing defense spending at a news conference was upheld; the
constitutional protection of free speech, said the court, did not state a public
policy for private employees.45 In another case, an employee objected to
his employer's racial discrimination by stating to a fellow employee,
"[b]lacks have rights too. '4 6 Even though he was protesting the employer's

illegal discrimination, he could be discharged for being too sympathetic to
African Americans.
A state court may require that the public policy be found in the state's
own laws. When an employee was discharged for refusing to falsify
records required by federal food and drug law, the court held that this did
40. See, e.g., Alan B. Krueger, The Evolution of Unjust-Dismissal Legislation in the
United States, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 644 (1991); Clyde W. Summers, Individual
ProtectionAgainst Unjust Dismissal: Time for A Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976).

41. See Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 175 (Pa. 1974).
42. See id. at 180.
43. See Patton v. J.C. Penney Co., 719 P.2d 854 (Or. 1986).
44. Frankel v. Warkwick Hotel, 881 F. Supp. 183, 186 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (quoting
Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 899 (3d Cir. 1983)).
45. See Korb v. Raytheon Corp., 574 N.E.2d 370 (Mass. 1991).
46. Bigelow v. Bullard, 901 P.2d 630, 632 (Nev. 1995).
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not provide a basis for the public policy exception under state law. 47 The
state had no obligation to recognize policies of federal law even where
there was a relevant federal statute.48 In addition, the exception may be
limited to those situations where the public's health and safety are affected;
it may not apply if only the internal affairs of the employer are involved.
Employees who have been discharged when they report to their superiors
evidence of embezzlement, inflated expense accounts, theft, false record
keeping, and kickback schemes of other employees have been denied
recovery; these, said the courts, are purely internal company matters not
directly affecting the general public.49 The public policy exception has
been whittled down, leaving most unjustly discharged employees with no
remedy. 0 The courts, in deciding these cases, give no weight to the
employee's interest in continued employment. If the public's interest is not
involved, the employer can dispose of its employees as it pleases.5'
Suits for intentional infliction of emotional distress are seldom
successful. The tort is defined as conduct "so outrageous in character and
so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and to
be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. 52
Courts seldom find that the employer's conduct meets this standard. For
example, when a doctor's secretary was brutally beaten and raped by her
estranged husband, the doctor discharged her and retroactively canceled her
health insurance. 53 The doctor told her that it was solely because she had
been the victim of a violent crime.5 4 The court held that this did not "rise to

47. See Guy v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 812 F.2d 911 (4th Cir. 1987).
48. See id.
49. See, e.g., Adler v. American Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464 (Md. 1981) (holding that
no cause of action existed when an employee claimed wrongful discharge for reporting
illegal management activities); Fox v. MCI Communications Corp., 931 P.2d 857 (Utah
1997) (deciding that wrongful termination for reporting possible criminal conduct by
coworkers does not substantially violate public policy); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765
P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (holding that an employee's discharge for reporting possible
embezzlement did not violate public policy).
50. Not all courts are so niggardly in applying the public policy exception. An
employee who was discharged for refusing to engage in "mooning" at a company picnic was
protected because this violated the statute against indecent exposure. See Wagenseller v.
Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985). The discharge of an employee who
refused to have sexual relations with a foreman violated the public policy of the statute
against prostitution. See Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984).
51. The courts do not apply the basic tort principle that intentional injury is prima facie
evidence of tort and creates liability unless justified. The unspoken logic may be that there
is no injury because the employee has no interest in his job, or that "the king can do no
wrong."
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) (citation omitted).
53. See Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
54. See id.
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the level of outrageousness necessary to support a claim. 5 Similarly, in a
New York case, an auditor with 23 years of service reported to officers of
the corporation that some managers were falsifying records so as to claim
large bonuses. 6 He was rewarded by being discharged, publicly escorted
from the building, and his belongings taken from his locked desk and
dumped on the street beside him. The employer's conduct, said the New
York court, "fall[s] far short of [the] strict standard" required by the
Restatement of Torts. 7 In another case, an employee was harassed by her
supervisor, suspended in front of customers and fellow employees,
demoted to a position under a person she had supervised, and received an
$11,000 salary cut. 8 As a result of her emotional trauma, she was
hospitalized and unable to return to work. The court set aside a jury verdict
on the grounds that this did not reach the level of "outrageous" conduct.
The dissenting judge observed that "[t]he message that comes through...
is that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress does not exist
in the employer-employee context." 59 These cases lay bare the courts'
conceptions of how employers are entitled to treat their employees.
Similarly, the handbook rule has given much less protection than first
promised. Although it was directly contrary to the employment at will
doctrine by protecting employees with indefinite terms, it has not been
extended to cases where other forms of assurance of continued or
permanent employment exist. Instead, it has been limited to cases in which
the employer has distributed a handbook or policy manual. Even this
protection has been seriously undercut by allowing employers to escape
contractual liability by including in the handbook a disclaimer provision
such as: "This Employee Handbook is not intended to create any
contractual rights in favor of you or the Company," or "Employment may
', 60
be terminated at any time, with or without cause and without notice.
Although some courts require such disclaimers to be conspicuous and in
larger print,61 others have not. A disclaimer in ordinary type on the last
page of a fifty-three page handbook was held sufficient to negate any
55. Id. at 802.
56. See Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 87 (N.Y. 1983)
(finding that plaintiff did not state a valid cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress).
57. Id. at 90.
58. See Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat'l Mgmt. Co. v. Weathersby, 607 A.2d 8 (Md.
1992).
59. Id. at 24.
60. See generally Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Effect of
Disclaimers,13 INDUs. REL. L.J. 326 (1991).
61. See, e.g., Nicosia v. Wakefern Food Corp., 643 A.2d 554 (N.J. 1994) (finding that a
disclaimer must be placed in a prominent position); Dell v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 811
F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that a "sign off sheet" explaining the terms of employment
was sufficient to alert an employee to his at will status).
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protection by provisions in the handbook.62
Developments in Michigan, whose supreme court gave birth to the
handbook rule in 1980, dramatically illustrate the unfulfilled promise held
out by this exception to the employment at will doctrine. In 1991, the
Michigan Supreme Court cut the legs off the handbook exception by
expressly limiting its earlier decision to its specific facts and holding that
the listing in the handbook of certain offenses as cause for dismissal did not
61
preclude dismissal for other reasons. It upheld the discharge of an eight
year commission salesperson for an unexplained absence despite the
employers assurances that as long as salespersons generated sales and were
honest, they would have a job. Another decision held that a statement in a
printed form signed by an employee when applying for a job which stated
that employment could be terminated with or without cause or notice
overrode the handbook that was subsequently given to the employee and
deprived it of any binding effect to protect the employee. 64 In addition, an
employer could revoke any promise of job security by simply issuing a new
manual with a disclaimer clause. 65 As a practical result, in Michigan, it is
the handbook rule, not employment at will, which has become an empty
shell.
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing held the greatest promise
of giving protection, not only to long service employees, but to other
employees who reasonably believed they would not be unjustly
discharged.66 The covenant however, has been effectively applied in
employment cases only in Alaska, California, Delaware, Idaho, and
Montana. 67 It has been expressly rejected in other states as inherently
inconsistent with the doctrine of employment at will. 68 California, which
was the leader in applying the doctrine, has severely limited it. First, the
California Supreme Court held that recovery could not be in tort, but only
in contract with its lesser damages. 69 Then, the court held that an employer
62. See Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277 (Iowa 1995) (holding
that a company handbook does not create contractual rights).
63. See Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co. Inc., 473 N.W.2d 268, 275 (Mich. 1991).
64. See Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453, 461-62 (6th Cir. 1986) (applying
Michigan law).
65. See Scholz v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 468 N.W.2d 845, 849 (Mich. 1991)
(holding that a signed disclaimer overrode an earlier conversation whereby the employer
agreed not to terminate the employee because she could not work on Sundays).
66. For a discussion of these cases, see Lillard, supra note 38.
67. See id. at 1259. It states that fourteen states used it "in some form," but
acknowledges that this is a generous characterization. See id. at fn. 155. An examination of
the cases she describes in her Appendix confirms her generosity. Only the five states
mentioned clearly relied on the covenant of good faith to hold a discharge wrongful.
68. See, e.g., Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 92, 58 N.Y.2d
293, 305 (1983).
69. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
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was in fact good cause for discharge, but only that
need not show that there
70
faith.
good
in
it acted
What has emerged is that judicially created exceptions to the rigid
employment at will doctrine, which had the potential for providing
employees, especially long time employees, with substantial protection
from unfair dismissals, have been so grudgingly applied by most courts,
that they are little more than paper shields against arbitrary employer
actions. The dominant judicial perspective is that employers should have
unfettered freedom to determine who should be employed and that workers
are subordinate to the employer's decisions-however arbitrary they may
be.
This, perhaps, paints too bleak a picture, for there is a marked
ambivalence in the law. First, not all courts have so grudgingly applied the
exceptions. In California, the courts have, at times, liberally applied one
exception after another so that employers complained of the many and
costly judgments won by employees.71 In Montana, employers confronted
with large damage awards for violations of the covenant of good faith
sought refuge in a statute which prohibited discharge without just cause,
but limited damages to lost wages.72 Second, since 1890, unions have
negotiated collective bargaining agreements which prohibit dismissal
without just cause. By 1950, over ninety percent of all collective
bargaining agreements included such provisions. These clauses, liberally
interpreted to give employees effective protection, have been regularly
enforced without question through arbitration and the courts. However, it
must be noted that less than ten percent of private sector employees are
protected by collective agreements. 73 Third, statutory exceptions are
commonplace. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 prohibited all
discrimination in the employment areas of hiring, promotion, work
assignment, and dismissal because of union activities. 74 The Civil Rights
Act of 1964 similarly prohibited discrimination because of race, creed,
76
75
nationality, and sex, and now discrimination is prohibited because of age
70. See Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int'l, Inc., 948 P.2d 412 (Cal. 1998).
71. See J. DERTOUZOZ ET AL., THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
WRONGFUL TERMINATION 26-27(1989) (stating that in tort actions a wrongfully discharged
employee can recover damages for emotional distress and punitive damages. In cases
discharged employees won in California, the median damages award was $177,000, with the
ten highest recoveries averaging nearly $4 million).
72. See Jonathan Tompkins, Legislating the Employment Relationship: Montana's
Wrongful-DischargeLaw, 14 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 387 (1998).
73. See U.S DEPT. OF LABOR, Bureau of Labor Statistics News Release, Jan. 19, 2000.
74. See National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) § 8(3) (current version at 29
U.S.C.A. § 158 (1999)).
75. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253, § 703 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000a et seq. (1999)).
76. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1999).
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and disability.77 In addition, dozens of federal and state statutes have
clauses prohibiting retaliation against those who seek to enforce a statute,
complain of violations, or testify in proceedings under a statute. 78
The near universal acceptance of just cause protection in collective
agreements, where they exist, and the multitude of legislatively mandated
exceptions to employment at will, sharpen the question, why does this
doctrine from the nineteenth century still have such resonance in the courts
today?
This may be explained as an example of judicial lethargy, an
unwillingness to upset existing precedent. The New York Court of
Appeals flatly rejected all tort and contract exceptions as devices to
circumvent "established doctrine," stating that "such a significant change in
our law is best left to the Legislature. 7 9 But it was the New York court's
reversal of its own decision and adoption of the employment at will rule
that gave impetus to its general acceptance. In other areas of the law, the
New York court has frequently upset long-settled rules. Moreover, other
courts demonstrated a willingness to innovate by creating exceptions, but
instead of generously expanding them, niggardly constricted them.
The courts are not alone in continued acceptance of employment at
will. Legislative proposals to prohibit discharge without just cause have
been introduced in many states and in Congress during the last twenty
years, but only Montana has adopted such a statute. 0 In 1991, the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the same group that produced the
Uniform Commercial Code, recommended a Model Employment
Termination Act for state legislation, but no state legislature has seriously
considered, much less, adopted it.s '
The question, now more broadly stated, is, why does employment at
will have such survivability in American labor law? Employment at will
draws its strength from the deeply rooted conception of the employment
relation as a dominant-servient relation rather than one of mutual rights and
obligations. The employer, as owner of the enterprise, is viewed as owning
the job with a property right to control the job and the worker who fills it.
That property right gives the employer the right to impose any requirement
on the employee, give any order and insist on obedience, change any term
of employment, and discard the employee at any time. The employer is
sovereign over his or her employee subjects.
77. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-14 (1999).
78. See generally M. Malin, Protectingthe Whistleblowerfrom RetaliatoryDischarge,
16 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 277 (1983).
79. Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89, 94 N.Y.2d 293, 301
(1983).
80. See Tompkins, supra note 72.
81. For discussion of this proposal, see Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Making of the
Model Employment TerminationAct, 69 WASH. L. REv. 361 (1994).
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OTHER MANIFESTATIONS OF EMPLOYER SOVEREIGNTY

To be sure, this conception of the employment relation does not
dominate all of American labor law. Countless statutes and courts have
But perpetuation of
created rules to curb employer absolutism.
employment at will, with its toleration of injustice, signals the continued
presence of a deep current in American labor law. This conception of the
employment relationship and its underlying assumptions surfaces at a
number of points, giving American law some of its unique characteristics.
A few illustrations should suffice.
(1) The National Labor Relations Act, in section 8(a)(50), expressly
prohibits an employer from discriminating in employment to encourage or
discourage membership in a union. In the Darlington82 case, the employer
bitterly opposed the union's organizing efforts and threatened to close the
mill and go out of business if the employees voted for union representation.
When the union won the representation election, the company made good
on its threat, closing the plant and dismissing hundreds of employees. The
Supreme Court held that the employer had the absolute right to go out of
business, even though motivated solely by its dislike of unions and its
desire to punish the employees for joining the union. "A proposition that a
single businessman cannot choose to go out of business if he wants to,"
said the Court, "would represent such a startling innovation that it should83
not be entertained without the clearest manifestation of legislative intent.
The explicit words prohibiting the employer from discriminating against its
employees because they supported the union were not enough. The Court
thus held that an employer, with the meanest motive, with maximum pain
to its employees, and with the most vivid object lesson to workers
generally, could discharge all its employees, liquidate the assets, and carry
away the cash to invest elsewhere. The Court reached this result by
reading into the statute a strong presumption of employer unilateral control
and absence of any employee stake in the enterprise. The assumption
undergirding employment at will overrode the explicit statutory protection.
(2) The National Labor Relations Act requires an employer to bargain
in good faith with the majority union "with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment." 84 The statutory intent was to
give employees a voice in matters which directly affected them. In First
National Maintenance,85 a multi-establishment employer closed one of its
establishments without any notice or discussion with the union representing

its employees, dismissing all thirty-five employees. The Supreme Court
82.
83.
84.
85.

Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
Id. at 270.
29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d) (1999).
First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
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acknowledged that the employer's decision had a direct impact on the
workers' employment but disingenuously declared that it "had as its focus
only on the economic profitability of the contract."8 6 Then, invoking the
spirit of Darlington, the Court added that it was "akin to the decision
whether to be in business at all."" The Court not only explicitly rejected
that the employees' elected representative should "become an equal partner
in the running of the business enterprise," but denied that employees had
any legitimate interest in the profitability of the enterprise.8 They were to
be treated as hired hands with no stake in the enterprise. The court
emphasized the "employer's need for unencumbered decisionmaking,"
stating that, "[m]anagement must be free from the constraints of the
bargaining process to the extent essential for the running of a profitable
business."89 Despite the statutory obligation to bargain with the employees'
representative, management retained the prerogative to make this decision
which vitally affected the working lives of its employees by depriving them
of their jobs without even listening to the employees' representative. This
is a virulent expression of the presumption which underlies employment at
will-the sovereignty of the employer to dispose of its subjects' jobs, with
no duty to listen or explain.
(3) Under the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Mackay Radio &
Telegraph Co.,9° an employer, during a strike, can hire replacement
workers for the strikers, and when the strikers offer to return to work, the
employer can refuse to return them to their jobs and elect to keep the
replacements in their place. The effect is to deprive a striking employee of
his job, even though the statute emphatically states that he remains an
employee while on strike, and to give preference to a subsequent employee
solely because he worked during the strike. This runs squarely against
section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, which prohibits
discrimination for engaging in union activity. The Court justified the
employer's discrimination against those who strike on the basis of the
employer's "right to protect and continue his business."'" This is not a right
stated, or even implied, in the statute, but drawn, like the right to go out of
business in Darlington, from the Court's assumption that the employer's
property rights in the enterprise have priority over the employees' right to
engage in concerted activity protected by the statute and the employees'
interest in continued employment. It would fit more comfortably into the
statutory scheme to say that when the employer and the elected
86. Id. at 677.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 676.

89. Id. at 678-79.
90. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
91. Id. at 345.
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representative of its employees come to an impasse, operations should
cease. This, of course, would assume that employees are members of the
enterprise essential to its operation. The Court's assumption is the
opposite. The decision to continue operations is legally vested in the
employer; the employees have no legally protected interest and are
disposable by replacement workers.
(4) The employees' status in the transfer of undertakings provides
another manifestation of the underlying premise that the employer has
sovereign power over the workplace, and employees are subjects without
rights. The transferor and transferee employers have absolute power to
determine the employees' rights or lack of rights. The transferor has no
continuing obligation to the employees; after the transfer they cease to be
the transferor's employees, and the transferee has no obligation to hire
them. If the transferee retains any of the employees, it can dictate new
terms and conditions of employment. The transferor and transferees can
agree that the employees shall continue to be employed under existing
terms, but such agreements are rare.
The presence of a collective agreement with the transferor which
prohibits discharge without just cause gives the employees no added rights
to continued employment with the transferee, for the transferee is not
bound by the transferor's agreement. In Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit
Local Joint Executive Board,92 the transferor had a collective agreement
which prohibited discharge without cause and provided for arbitration of
discharges. When the transferee refused to continue many of the
employees, the union sought arbitration of their discharge. The Supreme
Court held that the transferee had the right not to hire any of the transferor's
employees, and that it was not bound by the transferor's collective
agreement to arbitrate. The fact that the agreement provided that it would
be binding on "successors, assigns, purchasers, lessees or transferees"
could not bind the transferee to the substantive terms of the agreement or
the arbitration clause, unless the transferee expressly agreed to be bound.
If the transferee hires half of its staff from employees dismissed by the
transferor, it must recognize and bargain with the union for a new
agreement. But if the transferee does not hire a majority of the employees,
not only does the collective agreement cease to exist, but union
representation ceases to exist as well.93
(5) In the interpretation of the collective agreement, analysis begins
with the premise that, except for the collective agreement, the employer has
the prerogative of unencumbered decision making on all matters
concerning the enterprise. The collective agreement is conceived as only

92. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
93. See NLRB v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
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circumscribing those prerogatives; the employer remains free to act except
as limited by express or implied provisions in the agreement. 94 Most
arbitrators, in interpreting the agreement, follow this "reserved rights"
theory, which states that the employer retains all rights except those
conceded expressly or impliedly by the terms of the agreement, although
arbitrators are quite ready to find implied obligations of employers where
the facts warrant. The burden, however, is on the union or employee to
show that the employer agreed to the limitation of its prerogative. This is
the presumption of the Wood's Rule writ large.
(6) The priority given to employer control is illustrated by the "obey
and grieve" rule generally followed in arbitration. If the employer gives an
order which directly violates the agreement, the employee still has a duty to
obey unless obeying would risk serious bodily injury.95 If the employee
refuses to obey the wrongful order, there is "just cause" to discharge.
Arbitrators hold that the employee should obey and file a grievance, even
though winning the grievance gives the employee only a paper remedy, for
the only sanction on the employer is an arbitrator's slap on the wrist, a
declaration that the order violated the agreement. The employer's wrongful
order, in effect, takes priority over the employee's rights.
(7) The conception that the employer is lord and master leads to
significant restrictions on the employee's right of privacy.96 To claim a
right of privacy, a person must show a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The employer, simply by announcing in advance that employees' lockers
will be searched, that employees will be subjected to drug testing, or that
employees' private affairs will be investigated, may claim that employees
who continued working after such an announcement had no reasonable
expectation of privacy. Employee consent may also be a defense to
invasion of privacy, and employees at will can be caught in a "catch 22." In
Jennings v. Minco Technology Labs, Inc. 97 the court refused to enjoin
random drug testing, holding that it did not invade privacy because only
those consenting were tested. Those who did not consent were discharged
as employees at will. Another court held that discharge for refusal to
consent was not contrary to public policy, because "[t]he right by its very
name is a private right, not a public right."98
In the absence of consent, the invasion of privacy must be justified,
94. See M. HiLL & ANTHONY SiNcROPI, MANAGEMENT RIGHTS (1986).
95. See James A. Gross & Patricia A. Greenfield, Arbitral Value Judgments in Health
and Safety Disputes: Management Rights Over Workers' Rights, 34 BuFF. L. REv. 645

(1985).
96. See generally Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Privacy, American Values, and The
Law, 72 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 221 (1996); Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy and
the Employment Relationship,57 OHiO ST. L.J. 671 (1996).

97. 765 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
98. Luck v Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 635 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
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and in determining justification the interests of the employer in conducting
its business must be weighed against the employee's interest in privacy. In
balancing these interests, courts frequently load only one side of the scale.
An employer, investigating whether an employee was collecting
compensation illegally for a work injury, used a telephoto lens to take
pictures through an open window inside the employee's home, had an
investigator pose as a process server to get inside the home, and also sent a
letter to the employee's doctor to get medical information. The court,
without weighing the degree of intrusion on the employee's privacy against
the employer's need, found no unreasonable intrusion of the employee's
privacy because
"privacy was subject to the legitimate interest[s] of his
99
employer.

The court's heavy hand on the employer side of the scale is epitomized
by Baggs v. Eagle-PicherIndustries, Inc. °° In Baggs, the Sixth Circuit
acknowledged that drug testing invaded privacy because it "can reveal a
host of private medical facts about the employee, including whether he or
she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic."' '° Also the method of taking urine
invaded the employee's privacy and is "an intrusion that a reasonable
person might find objectionable.1 0 2 These employee interests, however,
caried no weight. The drug testing was upheld with the blanket license
that, "a Michigan employer may use intrusive or even objectionable means
to obtain employment related information."'' 03
Even when the court considers the employee's privacy, it may be
dismissed as worthy of little weight. In another work injury case, the
investigator masqueraded as a marketing researcher, gaining repeated
access into the employee's home. The court minimized the intrusion by
saying that the investigator never entered the house without permission and4
the visits were short, although the "permission" was obtained by fraud.'0
With similar dismissive reasoning, a court held that requiring a male
employee to provide a urine sample under the direct observation of a
female supervisor did not violate the employee's right of privacy.'0 5 "[T]he
intrusiveness of the search was slight,' '. 6 said the court, "nothing more than
a momentary bashfulness" and taking the urine was not significant, since it

99. Saldana v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 443 N.W.2d 382, 384 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (citation
omitted).
100. 957 F.2d 268, 274 (6th Cir. 1992).
101. Id. at 273.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 275.
104. See Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
105. See Fowler v. New York City Dep't of Sanitation, 704 F. Supp. 1264, 1273, 1270
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
106. Id. at 1273.
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1
was only a "waste product.
In Smyth v. Pillsbury Co.,' °" the employer encouraged employees to
communicate with each other by e-mail, repeatedly assuring them that all
messages would be confidential and would not be intercepted or used
against them. In spite of these assurances, an employee was dismissed
when an e-mail message was intercepted which had "inappropriate and
unprofessional" comments derogatory of management. The court stated,
inexplicably, that the employee had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
e-mail, and even if he did, a reasonable person would not find the
interception highly offensive. In another case an employer ordered its
employees not to associate with a former employee who had been
discharged on unproven charges of sexual harassment and fighting. 1°9 The
court held that forbidding employees to associate with a friend off the job
was not highly offensive.
As these cases indicate, in the courts' view, an employee's right of
privacy is a hollow shell against the lead weight of the employer's claim to
conduct business as it pleases. The employer's interest is presumed to be of
compelling weight without serious inquiry as to whether its interest is
worthy of protection. This is the same conception of the employment
relation which underlies employment at will-the sovereignty of the
employer and the subservience of the employees.
07

VI.

CONCLUSION

There is a pervasive ambiguity in American labor law regarding the
rights and status of individual employees. The cases discussed here reflect
but one face of that ambivalence. There is an opposing face reflected in
those court decisions which apply the exceptions in order to protect
employees from unjust dismissal. Also, the employers' prerogative power
has historically been circumscribed by protective legislation and qualified
by collective bargaining legislation. The central point here is to emphasize
that the conception of the employment relation as one of employer
dominance and employee subservience continues to be a powerful, if not a
prevailing, force in American labor law. It breaks through to qualify and
undermine those judicial decisions and legislative provisions designed to
recognize employees' rights in their jobs and their voice in the workplace.
Labor legislation in the United States is often half-hearted. Statutory
minimum wages are not enough to support a single worker, much less a
family. Health and safety legislation looks good on paper but is woefully

107. Id. at 1270.
108. 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
109. See Glasgow v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 901 F. Supp. 1185 (N.D. Miss. 1995).
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lacking in enforcement. The Family Medical and Leave Act110 enables
parents to take leave for childbirth and for child and family care, but it is
unpaid leave which many workers cannot afford to take. The Plant Closing
Law... requires only large employers to give sixty days notice, and
provides no severance pay. The United States has no statutory paid
holidays or vacations, no statutory severance pay or sick pay, and no
mandatory medical insurance. Although many employers provide these,
the great majority of workers lack one or more of these protections which
are commonplace in other industrialized countries.
The lack of legal protection could be remedied through collective
bargaining, for collective agreements regularly prohibit discharge without
just cause, provide living wages, sick pay, severance pay, paid holidays and
vacation, and often medical insurance. But collective bargaining laws are
not adequately enforced and are not able to overcome virulent employer
anti-unionism. With less than ten percent of private sector workers covered
by collective agreements, the collective bargaining system does not provide
a model for those not covered. One of the sources of this weakness is the
continued conception of employers as masters of the enterprise which gives
them wide scope for their anti-unionism. It is employment at will and its
fundamental assumption which is the major barrier to establishing a system
of collective bargaining.
The one form of relatively effective legal protection of workers is the
prohibition of discrimination against identified minorities-race, creed,
nationality, sex, age, and disability. But these laws limit employer
prerogatives only to the extent of requiring that all employees be treated
equally. Members of the protected classes, like all other employees, can be
discharged without just cause, paid less than a living wage, denied sick pay,
paid holidays and vacation, and medical insurance.
Discerning trends in the law is risky, the trend may be more in the eye
of the beholder, but the trend in the last ten years has been toward more
employer dominance.
The courts' cutting back on exceptions to
employment at will, and the legislatures' failure to even consider proposed
statutes are indicative. One of the sources of this trend is the importation
into labor law of misconceived market economics which equate a labor
market to the market for fish. The focus is on the individual labor market,
ignoring the different potentials of a collective labor market. In the
individual labor market the employer's property rights in the enterprise give
the employer dominant economic power to control the workplace.
Arguments cast in terms of misconceived market economics are thus used
to validate the divine right of employers and the subjection of the

110. 29 U.S.C. § 2601.
111. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2101.
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employees. So long as these arguments have currency in the courts and the
legislatures, the bridge will not be to the twenty-first century but to the
nineteenth century.
On August 4, 1982, France overhauled its law applicable to shop rules
12
to set up a disciplinary procedure that employers are required to follow.
The date of August 4 to publish the act was not selected by accident. It was
a reminder and an echo of the night of August 4, 1789, during the French
Revolution, when the nobility was stripped of the privileges it enjoyed
under the kings. In American labor law, the monarchy still survives.

112. Act respecting workers freedom in the undertaking, August 4, 1982 (No. 82-689)
Vol. Legislation 1, International Encyclopedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations.

